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CONCEPT DECOMPOSITION
WALTER A. SEDELOW, JR.
Department of Computer Science
University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Little Rock, AR 72204
ABSTRACT
Historically, perhaps the most general paradigm for scientists has been decomposition
—
as with, e.g.,
'elements' inchemistry, and the basic structures/processes of theoretical physics. Knowledge represen-
tation research is encouraging a somewhat comparable activity incomputer science, by wayof the study
of knowledge representation structures and knowledge repesentation systems. Symbol sets, rules of
usage (including divergent inferencing engines)
volved in this process of decomposition.
Years of association with research in the history of science have
eventuated ina conspectual overview of the character ofscience at large
and ina perceived sense of science's Grand Design
— including con-
cept decomposition as well as other distinctive properties (Sedelow &
Sedelow, 1978; 1979). Despite traditional associations for the term
design, that Grand Design is not an individual invention, but, rather
a 'social invention' (Ogburn and Thomas, 1922). Itis not the work of
any one individual,nor even inits entirety the fully conscious plan of
a set of such, but, rather, the only partially intended, accreted result
ofa process Koestler (1959) spoke of tropically as in some respects even
sonambulistic. To a computer scientist, inthat perspective science itself
may be 'ultimately' decomposable into the behavior ofa Turing Machine
(Sedelow, 1980), or a Bavel Power Tier Automation (Bavel, 1988). Thus,
although conventionally there is an ascription ofconscious intent, much
of the detail ofscience, both in the large and in fine, does not require
a positing ofconsciousness (Gregory, 1987) and ofdeliberate intent to
account for patterns we find/invent inthe output of the scientific enter-
prise; some indicationof that approach is to be found inthe published
papers already cited on the formalization of historiography and the
analysis of science as discourse, especially withreference to the highest
level in the scientificity hierarchy.
Aside from the major scientific achievements in China inearlier cen-
turies (Needham, 1954) as well as the notable achievements of early
Islamic science, and taking science as at least predominantly an
Occidental enterprise —and in the longer perspective of worldhistory
perhaps the Occident's primary accomplishment
—
itdoes seem ap-
parent that the most general scientific paradigm (inKuhn's, 1970, earlier
view ofthe roleof paradigms) has been decomposition. That emphasis
on decomposition in the Grand Design of science is evident both by
way of the examination of the history of the individual sciences and
also by way of the study of the contrastive possibility of an emphasis
on systemic understanding.
Efforts to enhance the intellectual and technical power ofcomputer
science as an academic discipline (Sedelow, 1989) encounter numerous
adamantine obstacles, many of them consequences of the pay-offmatrix
incomputer applications
—
which is so loaded as to reward short-term,
purely technique, trivia at the expense of scientific depth. Even ina
computer science specialty so necessarily concerned with 'ideas' as
expert systems, and artificialintelligence, that scientifically disad-
vantages condition has obtained. Nonetheless there are those like John
McCarthy who, while indubitably making shorter-term 'practical' con-
tributions (e.g., the language LISP), have persisted in an effort to achieve
such generality of results (e.g., on the predicate calculus, as presented
in his Turing Lecture, 1987) as contribute to that cumulativeness crucial
to the growth of science.
Inthe domain of human language computing, and more specifically
expert systems, there is in the LittleRock division of the University
ofArkansas system an on-going effort
—
whichhas been aided by grants
from The National Science Foundation, the Office ofNavalResearch,
the U.S. AirForce, and The Exxon Educational Research Foundation—
tocontribute to that depth of result which distinguishes science from
technology, as wellas to accord withthat grand design inscience which
fosters decomposition. More specifically, and as also developed by S.
Sedelow (inpress), some of that effort is directed to the study of whole
'natural' languages as knowledge representation structures employable
on the computer.
and conceptual primitives are among the entities in-
Inthe aftermath of the consensual recognition of the non-productivity
of the General Problem Solver (GPS) ofSimon, Newell, and Company
(on the Computer Science faculty at Carnegie-Mellon University), there
developed an enthusiasm for specific problem solvers highly engineered
to accommodate massive informational pump-priming, so that a
minimum oflearning (contra Rosenblatt and Bloch's 'Perceptron') by
the computer-based system was required. Unfortunately for the devel-
opment of computer science, and for the development of science
generally, a domain-specificity/generic-reasoning contrast was not
problematicized, with the result that now more than a generation of
computer science students have been professionally enculturated with
the notion that inbuilding cognitively robotic (Sedelow, 1988) or ar-
tificially intelligent systems one has to opt for domainal narrowness
in order to avoid a dead-end inan impoverished and barren abstract-
ness. But now we can begin to see our way clear to attaining the
advantages of that breadth ofscope sought by the builders of the General
Problem Solver at the same time that
—
through modelling the seman-
tic structure of a decomposed whole human language
—
we can engage
in the specific human language transforms which are at the core of
expert systems and numerous cognitive robotic applications (Marr,
1982).
At the moment the expert systems of AImight more accurately be
described as artificial idiots savants. While to build an artificial idiot
savant is a considerable accomplishment
—
after all, an idiot savant
specialized toplaying chess is demonstrating considerable skill, nomatter
what may be his/her limitations otherwise
—
nonetheless it does not
demonstrate that capacity for general-purpose symbol manipulation that
wespeak ofas a manifestation ofat least verbal and logicomathematical
intelligence.
Inthe process of building expert systems numerous types of decom-
position are employed, irrespective of whether the systems inquestion
are domain-narrow or domain-transcendent (Sedelow and Sedelow,
1988). Among the types of entities which knowledge representation
specialists examine are symbol sets (such as an alphabet or a number
system). There also is decomposition into rules of usage governing what
constitutes an acceptable string of items made up from a symbol set,
as well as decomposition into well-formed formulas, inferencing engines,
etc. Itis now also possible to decompose the meaning space
— in the
sense of a mathematical space
—created by a human language at any
given stage of its evolution. If, as intype-token mathematics, a distinc-
tion is made between types and tokens, the types as gathered together
for a language and then sorted alphabetically comprise a dictionary's
main entries.
The wordtypes used in the definitional components ofthat dictionary
could be regarded as a set of primitives (Sedelow and Sedelow, inpress).
Nowif,one way oranother
—
whether intrees, insemi-rings, or with
some other discrete mathematical structure (webs, for example), perhaps
not yet invented
—
an effort is made at least partially to order that
set ofprimitives, the result is a semantic space structure for the language
as a whole which also provides abasis for comparing one language with
another (Sedelow, 1988), even ifthose comparisons have to be made
withthe aid of a supra-binary (multi-valued) logic, such as rough sets
(Grzymala-Busse and Sedelow, 1988).
Many years of research stand behind the formalized symbolic pro-
cesses (necesarily only glancingly) referred to here, and inSally Yeates
Sedelow's paper in this Proceedings. Perhaps the best single introduc-
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tion to further knowledge ofthis work wouldbe by Sedelow and Sedelow
(1986); Sedelow and Sedelow (1987); and Sedelow and Sedelow (in
press).
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